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The current supplied to the circuit by an ideal current source is independent of circuit voltage. As a current source is controlling the flow of charge in a circuit, it is classified as an active element. Although not as obvious as a current or voltage source — transistors are also an active circuit component.
This is because transistors are able to amplify the power of a signal see our article on transisors as an amplifier if you want to know exactly how. A passive component is an electronic component which can only receive energy, which it can either dissipate, absorb or store it in an electric field or a magnetic field.
Passive elements do not need any form of electrical power to operate. Passive components cannot amplify, oscillate, or generate an electrical signal. A resistor is taken as a passive element since it can not deliver any energy to a circuit.
Instead resistors can only receive energy which they can dissipate as heat as long as current flows through it. An inductor is also considered as passive element of circuit, because it can store energy in it as a magnetic field, and can deliver that energy to the circuit, but not in continuous basis.
The energy absorbing and delivering capacity of an inductor is limited and transient in nature. That is why an inductor is taken as a passive element of a circuit. A capacitor is considered as a passive element because it can store energy in it as electricfield.
The energy dealing capacity of a capacitor is limited and transient — it is not actually supplying energy, it is storing it for later use. As such it is not considered an active component since no energy is being supplied or amplified. A transformer is also a passive electronic component.
Although this can seem surprising since transformers are often used to raise voltage levels — remember that power is kept constant. When transformers step up or step down voltage, power and energy remain the same on the primary and secondary side. As energy is not actually being amplified — a transformer is classified as a passive element.
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Cables Circuit Protection Devices Crystals Mechanical Devices such as a Fan, Lamp PCB Piezoelectric devices Resonators Switches Terminals and Connectors. Active Components Passive Components Active Device transforms and injects power or energy into a circuit.
Active element produces energy in the form of voltage or current Passive element stores energy in the form of voltage or current. They are energy acceptor They lay in Linear category They lay in Non-Linear category.
The Two Types of Electronic Devices Electronic elements that make up a circuit are connected together by conductors to form a complete circuit.
Active components Passive components Active Components An active component is an electronic component which supplies energy to a circuit. Common examples of active components include: Voltage sources Current sources Generators such as alternators and DC generators All different types of transistors such as bipolar junction transistors, MOSFETS, FETs, and JFET Diodes such as Zener diodes, photodiodes, Schottky diodes, and LEDs Voltage Sources A voltage source is an example of an active component in a circuit.
Current Sources A current source is also considered an active component. A stand alone trackable object which provides lightning fast 6 DoF tracking information for any object to which it is applied, including players' hands and feet for fullbody player tracking.
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Adjustable glides are an ideal leveling solution for any industrial or commercial furniture. These are a very high level general description of electronic components. They can actually be subdivided into even finer categories. Example: terminals, connectors, cable, switches, resistors, protection devices, capacitors, magnetic devices, piezoelectric devices, crystals, resonators, power sources, transducers, sensors, detectors, semiconductor diodes, transistors, integrated circuits, optoelectronic devices, displays, vacuum tubes, discharge devices, antennas, prototyping aids, mechanical accessories, and others.
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com SBI! For more interesting information and special deals related to any of the issues on this page, place your cursor over the double underlined links. All information supplied by Kontera. Electronic Components Electronic components are the basic electronic elements that make up an electronic device.
This is really great news for audio enthusiasts like us! What will they be used for? How quickly will they need to respond? For how long will they be needed? Answering these questions involves assumptions about likely threats to national interests, how frequently the United States will deploy Army units in response to those threats, and what type of mission they will need to conduct when responding to those threats.
Given those broad parameters, several factors should be considered in determining how much of the "demand" can be met with AC forces and with RC forces.
The missions anticipated for Army units play a key role in determining the number and types of units the Army maintains in its force structure. However, some observers argue AC and RC units are not identical in terms of availability and, at least in some circumstances, are not identical in terms of capability; hence, they are not always interchangeable for mission planning purposes.
For example, AC Army units are usually considered better positioned to respond to crises requiring immediate action because they are more readily available; that is, they typically require less notification, preparation and train up time prior to deployment than similar RC units.
Additionally, given policy constraints on the length of RC activations discussed more below , AC units are often preferred for "forward presence" missions overseas, such as the main Army forces in Europe and South Korea.
More controversial is the contention that AC and RC units of the same type are not identical in terms of their capability.
See footnote 23 Some argue that AC units are superior to their RC counterparts in certain respects, and are therefore better suited for certain missions—most notably high intensity combat or "combined arms maneuver. Historically, one of the barriers to use of the RC was the limited circumstances under which they could legally be ordered to active duty.
The principal activation authorities in effect after World War II—today known as Full Mobilization and Partial Mobilization Issues—limited reserve activations to times of war or situations where a national emergency had been declared by Congress or the President.
In , a new authority, now known as Presidential Reserve Callup Authority, allowed the President to activate reservists for missions without a declaration of emergency, though the duration of this type of activation was limited, as was the number of reservists who could be activated at any given time.
Subsequent amendments expanded the scope of this authority significantly. The FY National Defense Authorization Act added two new activation authorities: one to permit activation of reservists for up to days to respond to disasters, and another to permit activation of reservists for up to one year for "preplanned mission in support of a combatant command.
These activation authorities are summarized in Appendix E. The lowering of legal barriers to reserve activations has contributed to the increased use of reservists in recent decades and eased the concerns of senior defense officials that reservists will be available when needed.
Still, when considering whether to use reserve forces in a given role or for a particular mission, the reserve activation authorities place constraints on defense officials that do not exist for active forces. In particular, there are statutory limits on the number of reservists that may be activated, and the length of time that they may be ordered to active duty.
Since , there have also been DOD policy limitations on the frequency and duration of reserve activations that are stricter in certain respects than the statutory limits discussed in the next section. Finally, in considering the use of reserve units for specific roles and missions, defense planners must take into account the time it takes to invoke activation authorities for reservists, notify affected units, assemble their personnel, and conduct post-mobilization training.
During World War II, Army units typically deployed for the duration of the conflicts; thus, units and their personnel could spend three to four years deployed in combat zones. A different approach was used starting with the Korean War, when individuals were rotated in and out of theater on a periodic basis.
During the Vietnam conflict, soldiers were rotated in and out of the deployed unit for a one year "tour of duty" and then returned home.
While this policy addressed the issue of spending an extended period in combat, it also created a great deal of turbulence which some cited as having had an adverse impact on unit cohesion and discipline. With the advent of the All-Volunteer Force and the growth of military families, separating soldiers from their families for extended periods raised concerns about impacts on retention.
When it became apparent to military leadership that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would span many years, DOD established a deployment policy for the Active and Reserve components. In , the Secretary of Defense established a "deployment-to-dwell" policy for AC forces—which remains in effect today—indicating that the planning objective would be one year of deployment followed by two years at home station.
He also limited RC activations to a maximum of one year excluding individual skill training and post-mobilization leave , and set the "mobilization to dwell" planning objective for RC units at one year mobilized followed by five years demobilized.
In addition to the differences in ratios, another key distinction between the two policies is that the deployment-to-dwell ratio for AC units is tied only to time deployed, while the mobilization to dwell ratio for RC units is tied to time mobilized, which can include both pre-deployment training and deployment time.
For example, a one-year mobilization for an RC unit might include three months of train up followed by a nine-month deployment. These differences in policy for AC and RC units play a critical role in comparative cost estimates which use a deployed unit cost approach discussed later in the report.
Readiness is a term policy makers, analysts, and military leaders often cite when describing the state of the U. The Department of Defense defines readiness as "the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions. The data for DRSS comes from a report known as the Commanders Unit Status Reports CUSR or Unit Status Reports USR , which unit commanders submit to the Army component of DRSS known as DRSS-Army or DRSS-A.
Readiness can be evaluated in different ways, but Army readiness evaluations revolve around four main components: personnel , equipment availability, equipment readiness, and training, each of which is described below.
This readiness evaluation process is led by unit commanders, who assess readiness levels within the parameters specified by Army regulations. Sometimes the regulations require the commander to apply professional military judgment to a significant degree most notably in the case of training assessments ; while in other areas the commander's discretion is much more limited.
Ratios in each of these metrics generate a rating between 1 highest and 4 lowest according to a published scale, and the lowest of these three ratings is used to determine the overall "P-rating" of the unit.
This aspect of readiness is relatively objective and therefore requires limited application of a commander's professional judgment. Another readiness factor for Army units is the availability or supply of key equipment.
This is called the "S-level," and it is based on two metrics:. Like the P-level, ratios in each of these metrics generate a rating of between 1 and 4 according to a published scale, and the lowest of these two ratings is used to determine the overall "S-rating" of the unit.
This aspect of readiness is readily measurable. Equipment availability is heavily influenced by whether there is sufficient funding to procure the required equipment for a given unit, and by how senior policy makers chose to allocate equipment among units.
In the Cold-War era, RC units had comparatively low S-level ratings, as senior defense officials considered equipping these units to be a lower priority than equipping AC units. This changed significantly with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the large-scale and ongoing mobilization of RC units.
The third measured area for Army units is equipment readiness or serviceability. That is, is the unit's equipment fully functional or not? A unit could have all of its authorized equipment by type and numbers, but still suffer from poor equipment readiness if a large portion of authorized equipment or weapon systems does not work.
The "R-level" is determined by calculating the percentage of each pacing item that is fully mission capable, and the aggregate percentage of certain designated equipment "maintenance reportable equipment" in the unit's possession that is fully mission capable.
Each of these categories is rated between 1 and 4 according to a published scale, and the lowest of these ratings becomes the overall R-level. The R-level is heavily influenced by funding.
If there is not enough money for spare parts or to send a vehicle into depot level maintenance, equipment readiness can suffer. Unit manning can affect equipment readiness too. If there are not enough trained mechanics and supply personnel, repairs can be delayed. RC units have full-time support personnel dedicated to equipment maintenance, and the number of these personnel have increased since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began.
However, some argue that RC full-time manning levels are still less than optimal. The final measured area for Army readiness is the most subjective, and relates to training.
Training readiness does not lend itself to quantifiable evaluation to the same extent as personnel and equipment readiness, and so relies more heavily on the commander's professional military judgment. In assessing training readiness, unit commanders evaluate how well trained the unit is on certain key tasks, known as "mission essential tasks" or METs.
Commanders evaluate their unit's training proficiency in each MET as either trained T , needs practice P , or untrained U. Based on these ratings, a specified calculation methodology, and a published scale, the unit receives a T-level rating of between 1 and 4. An important tenet of training readiness is that all units—AC and RC—train to the same standards.
However, AC and RC units do not necessarily achieve proficiency at the same organizational level i. During the ARFORGEN cycle, RC units are typically funded to achieve platoon or company level proficiency prior to deployment, while AC units are often funded to achieve battalion or brigade level proficiency prior to deployment see " Differences in ARFORGEN Training Levels " later in the report.
Additionally, the data on which the commander's judgments are made can vary substantially. For example, there may be variations between units in the frequency of training, the ranges and resources available for the training, and the number and type of units represented in a training exercise. Operational deployments may also be used when evaluating a unit's training proficiency, so the commander of a recently deployed unit may be able to more accurately assess his or her unit's training status.
The C-level is equivalent to the lowest of these four levels, 61 although commanders have some ability to upgrade or downgrade the rating based on their professional military judgment. The C-rating is meant to reflect the unit's ability to accomplish its core functions, provide its designed capabilities, and carry out its mission essential tasks.
Army commanders may not upgrade or downgrade the ratings of the four main resource categories i. However, under certain circumstances, commanders may upgrade or downgrade the "C-level" rating of their unit.
They do this by comparing the C-level rating initially determined with the descriptions outlined in Army Regulation , which are summarized in Table 2.
If the two are mismatched in the commander's professional judgment, he or she may upgrade or downgrade the unit's C-level rating so it more closely aligns with the appropriate C-level description. Commanders of brigades and smaller organizations may upgrade or downgrade the C-level by one rating level on their own authority; changes of two rating levels require approval of a higher ranking commander of a specified rank.
Commanders of divisions and corps headquarters may upgrade or downgrade by up to two levels on their own authority. The commander must explain the rationale for any such subjective change.
The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to accomplish or provide the core functions and fundamental capabilities for which it was designed. The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to accomplish or provide most of the core functions and fundamental capabilities for which it was designed.
The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to accomplish or provide many, but not all, of the core functions and fundamental capabilities for which was designed. The unit requires additional resources or training to accomplish or provide the core functions and fundamental capabilities for which was designed.
The status of resources and training in the unit do not limit flexibility in methods to accomplish core functions. The status of resources and training in the unit may cause isolated decreases in the flexibility of choices to accomplish core functions.
The status of resources and training in the unit will result in significant decreases in flexibility to accomplish core functions. The status of resources and training in the unit will not increase vulnerability of unit personnel and equipment.
The status of resources and training in the unit will not increase the vulnerability of the unit under most envisioned operational scenarios. The status of resources and training in the unit will increase the vulnerability of the unit under many, but not all, envisioned operational scenarios.
Source: Adapted from AR , paragraph Emphasis added to highlight the differences between ratings. The metrics discussed above are considered the most important measures of readiness by the Army, but they do not encompass all the ways of measuring readiness.
Certain other measures of readiness are also available to commanders to inform any decision to upgrade or downgrade their readiness ratings. For example, Army databases provide information on personnel turnover rates, additional skill qualifications, language qualifications, and professional military education completion.
Other measures of readiness—for example, discipline, morale, and certain aspects of leadership and experience—while typically considered important aspects of unit readiness, are not formally integrated into the readiness assessment process.
Because the Army has limited resources, its units cannot all be maintained at the highest state of readiness C-1 at the same time.
One way of doing this is called "tiered readiness," with designated units continually maintained in the highest state of readiness, with the remainder maintained at lower readiness levels. This technique was used during the Cold War era, with many AC units and nearly all RC units normally maintained in lower readiness states; this approach assumed that there would be sufficient time and resources to improve their readiness in the event of a major conflict.
The reduction in AC force structure at the end of the Cold War, coupled with the pressures of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, generated a need to share the burden of deployment among more Army units.
Additionally, the Army also began to use its reserve units with greater frequency and so invested more resources in improving and maintaining the readiness of RC units.
Because the Army cannot maintain all of its forces at the highest state of readiness, a process is needed to bring units in a lesser state of readiness to a high state of readiness so they can be deployed to conduct full spectrum operations. The current process the Army employs is known as Army Force Generation ARFORGEN , a cyclical readiness system that applies to both the AC and RC.
Appendix D provides additional details on the ARFORGEN process. Discussions with the Army staff 63 indicate that AC BCTs enter the Available Pool trained up to the brigade level, meaning the unit is ready to be deployed and conduct full spectrum operations as a brigade.
In contrast, ARNG BCTs are only trained up to the platoon and company level prior to mobilization, meaning that only that BCT's platoons and companies are ready for full-spectrum operations. Additional resources and authorized training days could enable ARNG BCTs to train to a higher level prior to mobilization, or they can conduct additional train up during post-mobilization training.
Nonetheless, the disparity in training readiness has significant implications for the employment of ARNG BCTs in certain operations, particularly those that are complex or short-to-no-notice. Other types of RC units, such as separate battalions and companies, may achieve the same training levels as their AC counterparts prior to mobilization.
The Defense Readiness Reporting System is intended to broadly assess the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions, as illustrated in Table 2. Thus, two units with a C-1 rating—whether AC or RC—should both have the required resources and training proficiency to accomplish all of their core functions, without significant limitations on their flexibility of methods or increases in unit vulnerability.
However, in some circumstances this is not necessarily the case. Some possible examples include. Two of the P-level metrics—qualified in duty position and senior level personnel—consider whether the grade rank of a given individual corresponds to the doctrinally required grade of the position they occupy in a unit.
The required grade for the position is essentially a proxy for required experience level. This is reasonable given that military grade is closely tied to years of military service experience ; but years of active military service normally produce more military experience than do years of reserve military service, given that active service is full-time and reserve duty is often part-time.
Additionally, civilian experience is not captured at all by these metrics. Hence, a lieutenant colonel or master sergeant with 18 years of active military service will have substantially greater military experience than a lieutenant colonel or master sergeant with 18 years of reserve service.
This differential is not captured by the relevant P-level metrics. On the other hand, the lieutenant colonel or master sergeant with 18 years of reserve service may also have 18 years or more of civilian experience that is equivalent to or superior to that of his active duty counterpart.
This differential is not captured either. As discussed above, the Defense Readiness Reporting System DRRS is designed to assess the ability of units to "execute their missions, plans, and individual tasks based on their capabilities reflecting demonstrated performance in training and operations.
However, CRS was unable to find any studies which attempted to determine the extent of this correlation. There does not appear to be any systematic assessment of unit performance during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that would be suitable for comparing unit effectiveness between AC and RC units.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY included a provision requiring the Department of Defense to submit a report "setting forth an analysis of the costs of a sample of deployable units of the active components of the Armed Forces and the costs of a sample of similar deployable units of the reserve components of the Armed Forces.
The GAO assessment of the DOD report included the following statement:. Second, the report does not consider or comment on the effectiveness of either active- or reserve-component units when compared to each other.
DOD officials told us that there are differences across the services in the way that reserve-component units are employed, so it would be difficult to generalize about their relative effectiveness. The officials told us that it is a generally accepted principle that in most cases, similar active and reserve units should have comparable levels of effectiveness after completing sufficient training; however, they added that data for measuring active- and reserve-unit effectiveness are limited and inconsistently collected.
Because the report does not include a discussion of active- and reserve-unit effectiveness, the extent to which the unit-cost comparisons presented in the report can be used to inform force-mix decisions is limited.
The "generally accepted principle" discussed above that "similar active and reserve units should have comparable levels of effectiveness after completing sufficient training" makes intuitive sense, but it does raise some pertinent questions.
For example:. Which are less expensive: AC units or RC units? From one perspective, the answer appears obvious: an RC unit that is not activated is inherently less expensive than a similar AC unit, because the large majority of RC personnel only perform military duty part-time, whereas AC personnel perform military duty full-time.
This difference also affects comparative training and equipment maintenance costs. Additionally, even when an RC unit is activated , its cost should be roughly equivalent to a similar AC unit, as comparable AC and RC units have nearly identical equipment and personnel authorizations.
The differences hinge on three principal factors: 1 the range of costs being considered, 2 the apportionment of those costs between the AC and RC, and 3 assumptions about how often RC units will be in an inactive status versus an active status.
Each of these points is discussed below. From this perspective, RC units are not always less expensive than AC units, and in some cases they can be more expensive, because multiple RC units are needed to match the output of one AC unit.
This perspective is summarized below as well. An important factor in evaluating AC and RC costs relates to which costs to count. When comparing Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard costs, some analyses look only at personnel costs, or only at personnel costs plus operations and maintenance costs.
This disregards other costs, such as military procurement, research and development, and construction costs. A more expansive approach looks at the "top-line" budget figure for the Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard.
However, even this approach is not comprehensive as it omits certain costs covered by DOD, such as those associated with health care and commissaries. It also excludes military-related costs covered by other agencies, such as the costs of Veterans' Affairs educational, disability, and survivor benefits, or the Treasury Department's contributions towards military retirement, concurrent receipt, and the Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care fund.
Including more costs obviously increases the total cost of both AC and RC forces, and the way in which these costs are apportioned to the active component and the reserve component can significantly affect their comparative cost.
Another challenge associated with determining comparative AC and RC costs revolve around how to apportion certain costs. Certain costs can be apportioned to their respective component more easily because they are provided through separate budgetary accounts. For example, the active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard each have their own appropriations for personnel costs and for operations and maintenance costs.
Although even within these accounts, there are some shared costs that are difficult to allocate. For example, procurement of major weapons systems and equipment for the reserve components is done primarily via the active component account.
Apportioning the costs from these accounts to the respective components poses substantial challenges; but attributing all of the costs to the active component—particularly those spent to purchase reserve component equipment—distorts the comparative cost of active and reserve component forces.
Attributing these costs exclusively to the active component likewise alters the comparative cost calculation. Finally, some costs are difficult to apportion between the active and reserve components due to the lack of research on the most appropriate way to do so. For example, if one wished to consider veterans' benefits in the calculation of comparative active and reserve costs, one obstacle would be the limited understanding of the extent to which active and reserve personnel use these benefits, a problem compounded when one considers that many military personnel serve in both an active and a reserve capacity during their careers.
If RC units cost less than AC units when not activated, and about the same as AC units when activated, then the comparative costs will vary based on how frequently the RC unit is activated. Or, to put it another way, RC units will cost the least if they are never activated, cost the same as AC units if they are continually activated, and fall somewhere in between based on their ratio of active to inactive time.
Thus, an RC unit that is activated for one year out of every two years will be more expensive than one activated for one year out of every three years.
Likewise, an RC unit that is activated for one year out of every two years will be more expensive than one activated for nine months out of every two years. These ratios, often referred to as "deployment-to-dwell ratios," became an increasingly important part of understanding RC costs due to the large scale rotational deployment of RC units to Iraq and Afghanistan, and due to the desire of many policy makers to continue using RC units for operational missions in the future.
A major change in how AC and RC costs are discussed today comes in the area of correlating the "input" of cost dollars with various "outputs. This approach has been has been criticized for how costs are allocated between the AC and RC.
See previous section, " How Should These Costs be Apportioned Between the Active and Reserve Components? That is, even if AC soldiers cost five times more than RC soldiers using the above example , they also are on duty more often, train more often, and deploy for operational missions more often, potentially resulting in more "bang for the buck.
One such approach sought to "develop a means to compare the use of active versus guard and reserve forces per dollar spent. This method used the number of deployments as its output metric.
The second method calculated AC and RC personnel costs over the course of the year, and used days of duty performed as its output metric.
The authors' concluded that "In essence, this analysis shows that reserves are a good deal because the military services only have to pay for them when they are needed.
Because their retirement is deferred—not paid out until age 60—it is much less expensive than for active members However, there are limitations to this assessment too. Utilization of the force is more encompassing than simply being deployed. The second method, which focused on cost per day of duty performed, estimated that AC personnel would perform days of duty per year, that "statutory" reservists would perform 39 days of duty per year, and that "busy" reservists would perform days of duty per year.
It then estimated the compensation that each of these three servicemember types would receive over the course of the year, and divided that by days of duty performing.
The authors state, "The bottom line of this analysis is that the more days reservists serve, the less costly they are to use in other words, a busy reservist is cheaper than a statutory one.
However, this analysis reveals an unanticipated result. The more full-time benefits added to the cost of a reservist, such as TRICARE for Life health care accrual, the more expensive a part-time reservist is relative to his or her availability.
Still, at a time when U. forces were deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan at a fairly high rate, these individual member cost methods were also critiqued. From this perspective, the key issue was not the relative cost of an AC or RC soldier per duty day, but the relative cost of maintaining a continuous unit presence in an overseas theater.
The costing models developed for this "deployed unit cost approach" included two variables that profoundly affected comparative cost calculations: the deployment-to-dwell ratio for AC and RC forces and, for RC forces, the amount of time devoted to pre-deployment training.
This approach appears to have been developed first by Jacob Klerman and published in Rethinking the Reserves. The estimate is three for AC units and eight for RC units, assuming that AC units deploy 12 months out of 36 and that RC units train for three months and deploy for nine months out of and 8.
Thus, the ratio of RC to AC units is slightly less than 3 2. Combining the average costs of AC and RC units when deployed and non-deployed, with the number of units required to sustain one unit "boots on the ground," the author generates a "cost per unit of BOG" metric.
Subsequently, the author manipulates some of the key variables—deployment-to-dwell ratios, the proportion of the reserve component involved in deployments, and the relative cost of RC units when not deployed—to generate a table illustrating a range of potential relative costs.
The less favorable cost comparisons for reserve units under this cost approach generally involve:. The Army, as is the case with the other Services, cannot "afford" all of the resources it believes it needs—including force structure—to accomplish its assigned missions due to budgetary constraints.
In order to convey the impact of perceived inadequate resources to decision makers, DOD uses the concept of risk. DOD describes risk as follows:. Military and Political Risk : Military risk encompasses the ability of U. forces to adequately resource, execute, and sustain military operations in the near- to midterm, and the mid- to longer term.
In the international context, political risk derives from the perceived legitimacy of our actions and the resulting impact on the ability and will of allies and partners to support shared goals. In the domestic context, political risk relates to public support of national strategic priorities and the associated resource requirements in the near term, midterm, and long term.
Operational Risk: Operational risk is the ability of the current force to execute strategy successfully within acceptable human, materiel, financial, and strategic costs.
Consideration of operational risk requires assessing the Department's ability to execute current, planned, and contingency operations in the near term. Force Management Risk: Force management risk is our ability to recruit, retain, train, educate, and equip the All-Volunteer Force, and to sustain its readiness and morale.
This requires the Department to examine its ability to provide trained and ready personnel in the near term, midterm, and long term. Institutional Risk: Institutional risk is the capacity of management and business practices to plan for, enable, and support the execution of DOD missions.
It encompasses the ability to develop effective and efficient organizations and processes over the near term, midterm, and long term. Future Challenges Risk: Future challenges risk is the Department's capacity to execute future missions successfully, and to hedge against shocks.
Perhaps a more fully developed risk assessment, in conjunction with associated cost assessments, might prove to be of greater utility to decision makers. The above factors are all tied directly to the ability of the specified military forces to meet national security requirements.
Perhaps most notably, the United States' long tradition of a keeping a substantial military force structure in the reserve components can be traced to the ideological underpinnings of the nation's founding, which included a powerful aversion to professional military forces.
In the colonial and founding eras, "standing armies" and a naval establishment were considered by many to be the principal threat to democratic sovereignty and individual liberty. In the event of military crisis, the preferred solution was to call on "citizen-soldiers"—members of the militia—to augment a relatively small professional force.
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